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DAMAGED GOODS:
HUMAN NATURE AND ORIGINAL SIN
Peter King
The Doctrine of Original Sin seems to require that human nature has liter­
ally undergone a change from its prelapsarian to its postlapsarian condi­
tion. It is not clear that this claim makes sense. How can human nature, 
the feature(s) in virtue of which human beings are what they are, change 
in time? (Think of the parallel claim about V2.) I consider three medieval 
attempts to resolve this problem: (1) Augustine's two theories about shared 
human nature; (2) Anselm's proposal that original sin is an individual de­
ficiency; (3) the "biological" proposal suggested by Odo of Cambrai and 
developed by Pseudo-Joscelin.
Christian doctrine traditionally holds that human beings are damaged 
goods. Created with the full measure of goodness appropriate to embodied 
finite rational creatures, human beings have inflicted enough damage on 
themselves to have altered their ontological status. This happened in the 
persons of Adam and Eve, in the Garden of Eden, when they defied God's 
explicit command and did eat of the forbidden fruit; for this transgression 
they were cast out of Paradise. Human beings ever since have borne the 
guilt of this sin as well as punishment for it, the former relieved, at least 
in part, by Christ's mission of salvation.1 The change in our status was 
fundamental, disastrous, and irreversible (by our unaided powers). We 
are no longer as we once were—we are not even quite the kind of thing we 
once were.
This, of course, is the Doctrine of Original Sin. It lies at the heart of West­
ern Christianity. Fallen human nature, beset by original sin, is the reason 
for Christ's atonement and redemption of humanity through divine grace, 
accomplished by the Incarnation and the Crucifixion; there would be no 
call for a rescuer were we not in need of rescue. The Doctrine of Original 
Sin is intricately and inextricably fitted into the web of Christian dogma.
Yet I want to set aside theological issues in favor of what seems to me 
a more pressing, and baffling, metaphysical difficulty. According to the 
Doctrine of Original Sin, human nature has been changed as a result of the 
choices and actions of human beings. It is not clear that this claim makes 
sense. How can something literally change its own nature? What concep­
tion of 'nature' is at work, such that human nature is capable of being 
changed in time? How does a given choice or action 'affect' human na­
ture? On the face of it, these claims are nonsense. For the Aristotelian, the 
nature itself, "our glassy essence," is fixed and makes us the kind of thing 
we are; were it literally changed, prelapsarian and postlapsarian 'humans'
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would belong to different species. For the Platonist, our degree of partici­
pation in a Form may wax or wane, but the Form itself cannot change, and 
a fortiori it cannot change as a result of our actions. The available philo­
sophical accounts of natures treat them as abstract entities, as incapable of 
change in time by the actions of individuals as V2. It isn't that it would be 
exceptionally difficult or demanding for us to change V2; it's that it doesn't 
even make sense to talk about it.
This formidable metaphysical difficulty is at the heart of the Doctrine of 
Original Sin, threatening it with incoherence. Medieval philosophers were 
therefore driven to heights of speculative ingenuity, devising theories that 
would allow them to maintain the literal truth of the claim on which the 
Doctrine of Original Sin rests, namely that human nature changed as a 
result of human actions. Such theories, like the doctrine itself, begin with 
Augustine, who devised not one but two approaches to the difficulty— 
neither of which he found satisfactory (§1 ). There the matter lay until the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, when a different approach was taken by 
Anselm of Canterbury; some aspects of his solution were philosophically 
fruitful with regard to 'human nature' and developed by others, notably 
Odo of Tournai and an otherwise anonymous author known as 'Pseudo- 
Joscelin' (§2). I'll close with a brief description of its replacement by the 
consensus on the Doctrine of Original Sin under High Scholasticism.
1. Augustine
Although Augustine was not the sole author of the Doctrine of Original 
Sin—bits and pieces of it are found in Tertullian, Cyprian, and above 
all in his near-contemporaries Ambrose and Ambrosiaster—Augustine 
was undeniably its principal architect.2 Indeed, Augustine coined the 
term 'original sin,' and the formulation of the doctrine was so indebted 
to him that the Greek East, lacking Augustine in translation as well as 
in person, does not have the doctrine of original sin at all. Augustine 
presents an account of original sin as early as his De libero arbitrio, devel­
oped it further in his commentaries on Genesis, and brought it to its final 
formulation in the many works written in the course of his long battle 
against Pelagianism.3
The "ancient sin" (antiquum peccatum), as Augustine memorably calls 
it (mor. 1.22.40), was undeniably ours alone. Augustine is clear that Adam 
and Eve were fully possessed of free will in their prelapsarian condition, 
and thereby capable of not sinning. That is, Adam and Eve possessed the 
ability to not forsake the good, as well as the grace to persevere in so doing 
(corrept. 12.33-34). Furthermore, they were endowed with good wills, sub­
ject to neither vice nor sin (civ. 14.l1). God's sole command, to not eat the 
forbidden fruit, was "as easy to observe as it was simple to keep in mind" 
since there was an abundance of food and no desire contrary to the will 
(civ. 14.12). The sole purpose of the command was to make Adam and Eve 
aware of their due obedience, "the mother and the guardian of all other 
virtues in rational creatures." The fruit was neither harmful nor evil in it­
self. The point of God's command is to obey only because it is commanded 
(civ. 14.12). As such, the 'ancient sin' was all the worse for its disobedience, 
its heinousness magnified by the unimpeded freedom of the will in Eden
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(c. Iul. imp. 6.22). Augustine catalogues the sins wrapped up in the single 
act that was "the parent of all sin" (ench. 13.45):4
Pride was present in it, by which humans took delight in being their 
own masters rather than in God's power; sacrilege, too, since they 
did not believe God; murder, since they hurled themselves head­
long into death; spiritual fornication, since the integrity of the hu­
man mind was corrupted by the serpent's seduction; theft, since the 
forbidden food was snatched; greed, since they wanted more than 
ought to satisfy them—and anything else that can be uncovered in 
this single offence by careful analysis!
At its root was pride (superbia), technically the will's choice to turn aside 
from the immutable good (civ. 14.13), which constituted the actual sin— 
eating the fruit merely completed a transgression already accomplished in 
the will. The selfsame pride was at work in Adam's blaming Eve, and Eve's 
blaming the serpent; they tried to evade responsibility for their sin rather 
than humble their pride by seeking forgiveness (civ. 14.14). The result was 
catastrophic, although, Augustine admits, completely just and appropri­
ate (civ. 14.15). Human nature itself was changed (commutata), and not for 
the better (nupt. et conc. 2.34.57):5
Accordingly, our nature was at that time changed for the worse by 
the great sin of the first man. Not only was it made sinful, it also 
begot sinners.
Augustine repeatedly describes human nature as "damaged and de­
formed" (uitiata et deprauata) after the Fall.6 Since human nature is by defi­
nition common to all human beings, the damage it has suffered therefore 
affects all human beings. Precisely how it does so has yet to be determined. 
But the damage takes two forms that should be kept separate.
One effect of Adam's choice is that each human being "from the mo­
ment of birth catches an ancient death."7 Less poetically, each of us is 
born in a state of sin, in virtue of our human nature. It is not merely an 
inborn propensity or tendency to sin, though that may be present as well; 
we are each in an actual state of sin "from the moment of birth." This 
is a puzzle. The normal way to be in a state of sin is to commit a sin for 
which one has not been forgiven. It is obscure how a person could be in a 
state of sin without having done anything, and it is particularly obscure 
in the case of newborns, who are incapable of any act of will. Yet such 
is the doctrine. (We'll examine Augustine's attempts to solve this puzzle 
shortly.) Human nature was "made sinful" and thus each human being is 
tainted with sin, together making up the "condemned lump of the whole 
human race."8 Therefore, human nature is damaged by a culpable moral 
failing, "permanently suffused with original guilt in everyone" (originali 
reatu in omnia permanente confuderat) as Augustine memorably puts the 
point (Simpl. 1.2.20).
Another effect of Adam's choice, distinct from guilt, is the punishment 
it calls forth. Augustine identifies three distinct divine penalties inflicted 
on human nature: ignorance, death, and lust (concupiscentia).9 The first
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penalty is that we have become comparatively ignorant of the principles 
of right and wrong. In our prelapsarian condition it was obvious which 
courses of action were right and which wrong; in our postlapsarian condi­
tion it is not at all clear, and can be figured out only with difficulty. Broad­
ly speaking this is a 'cognitive' disorder to which we are now prey. The 
second penalty is that human beings are now doomed to die—our Dasein 
is structured by being-towards-death. Before the Fall, Augustine holds, 
humans were mortal, i.e., capable of dying, but were otherwise free from 
physical disorders. Adam and Eve were unaffected by disease (which was 
absent from Paradise), did not age, and were not destined to die. The third 
penalty affects the human 'blend' (contemperatio) of body and soul. We are 
now subject to strong and unruly desires that direct us elsewhere than at 
God, desires at best only partly under our control and often not even that. 
Augustine's generic term for such desires is 'lust,' which encompasses 
more than mere sexual appetite, though it certainly includes it; it is the 
sense of 'lust' as it appears in 'blood-lust' or 'lust for power'—a strong, 
if not irresistible, craving or compulsion. Yet while any gluttonous appe­
tite is an instance of lust, for Augustine sexual appetite is peculiarly well- 
suited as an example: its depth, passion, and forcefulness are undeniable, 
and the fact of non-voluntary sexual arousal illustrates in ourselves10 the 
same lack of obedience that Adam and Eve showed to God in Eden—tit 
for tat, so to speak.11 These three penalties exacted by God have left human 
nature ravaged by lust, wracked by disease and death, unsure of how to 
live rightly; they collectively make it well-nigh impossible for us to avoid 
sinning in this life.
In our present condition, then, we are tainted by original guilt and 
also suffer the penalties of sin. Christ's mission of salvation has laid the 
groundwork for canceling our guilt, by washing away all sins in the spiri­
tual rebirth that is baptism, but this has not affected the punishment we 
must endure. The fall from our pristine condition is far indeed.
There are further unhappy consequences of Adam's choice. These con­
sequences are not an instance of damage inflicted upon human nature, 
strictly speaking, but instead stem from our changed situation. For ex­
ample, we no longer have the ability to avoid sin by our unaided powers, 
and certainly not to persevere in such avoidance; God has 'withdrawn' 
his prelapsarian standing support for our endeavors, support that made it 
possible for us to avoid sin, and now His assistance is purely supereroga­
tory, i.e., given only as a matter of grace. This is a change in our extrinsic 
circumstances, having to do with the type of divine assistance extended to 
the human race, not a change in our intrinsic nature. I shall therefore put 
it aside for the time being (we'll return to it in §3).
Augustine's account of original guilt and the penalties of sin, recounted 
above, spells out the content of the Doctrine of Original Sin.12 It's time to 
return to the question with which we began. How is it possible for human 
nature to be changed by human actions?
As a first step to answering this question, Augustine implicitly endors­
es the following simplifying assumption:
(S) Whatever is such as to affect everything in a species must be part of 
the specific nature.
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Now (S) says roughly that anything that must hold of all humans is there­
by part of human nature. In aristotelian terms, these are propria: not part of 
the essence but characteristic of the subject, on a par with, say, the ability 
to laugh, present necessarily in all human beings but not part of their es- 
sence.13 It makes sense to expand 'nature' beyond the essence, as well, for 
essences are metaphysically thin—too much is not included in the strict 
definition rational animal for it to represent what human beings must be 
like. The key notion here is inclusive necessity: human nature includes 
all properties that must hold of all humans. This 'must' is the key to the 
metaphysical puzzle. On the one hand, if we can identify a property that 
affects all human beings and seems to do so with some kind of necessity, 
we have a good candidate for a feature that belongs to human nature. On 
the other hand, the 'must' is not logical; we can at least entertain the pos­
sibility that some property would come to be necessary (in some sense) 
for all humans at some point, and so characterize human nature thereaf- 
ter—and hence it is possible that human nature could change historically, 
perhaps even as a result of human choices and actions. Whether human 
nature is in fact changed this way depends on plausibly identifying some 
property or set of properties that come to affect all humans at some point, 
and subsequently, as a result of human choices and actions. According 
to (S), then, Augustine needs to show that original guilt and the penal­
ties of sin must affect all human beings as a result of Adam's (and Eve's) 
choices and actions—that is, in consequence of the "ancient sin." If so, he 
can maintain the literal truth of the Doctrine of Original Sin, that human 
nature has been damaged and deformed.
Matters are relatively straightforward in the case of Adam and Eve. 
Having transgressed God's command, each is eo ipso guilty; there is no 
puzzle how their choices and actions result in their guilt—their actions 
constitute their transgression, and hence their guilt, much as one becomes 
guilty of lying simply by telling a lie. Furthermore, there is no 'statute of 
limitations' for Adam and Eve; having sinned, they remain in the state of 
sin ever after, unless and until forgiven, which is beyond their power to 
bring about. Likewise, there is no metaphysical puzzle regarding the pen­
alties exacted from Adam and Eve by God. Assuming that the penalties 
are "completely just and appropriate," as Augustine argues (civ. 14.15), 
there is a straightforward sense in which Adam and Eve are responsible 
for their current condition, for they brought it on themselves. If the pen­
alty for theft is a year in prison and I am in fact guilty of theft (however my 
guilt be determined), then I have brought my jail term on my own head. 
True, the penalty is exacted by others. It is nevertheless correct to say that 
my present incarceration is the result of my own (thieving) choices and ac­
tions. Were the penalty instead to have one's hand cut off, I would reason­
ably be said to inflict this damage on myself, even though someone else 
would be the causal agent at work; the end result would be a damaged 
human being, and I might rightly be said to have inflicted the damage on 
myself. So too for Adam and Eve. The only disanalogy is not one that mat­
ters: it is not at all clear how we could become subject to ignorance, death, 
and lust as Augustine claims we are. But we don't have to know how God 
does it—a good thing, since it might not be knowable by us—all we need 
to know is that God can and does do it, by His omnipotence.
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Matters are less straightforward in the case of later generations. My 
daughter is not guilty of lying simply because I have told a lie; if she is 
not guilty, it is unfair to punish her for my guilt; nor will she lack a hand 
simply because mine was cut off. Unless original guilt and the penalties of 
sin affect all other humans, though, there is no interesting sense in which 
human nature was damaged by Original Sin.
Augustine separates the cases of punishment and guilt. For punish­
ment he offers what we may call a genetic inheritance model, where the pen­
alties of sin are physiologically transmitted from parents to children. Each 
penalty behaves like a strongly dominant heritable trait; it is relatively 
easy for such a trait to become uniformly distributed throughout an en­
tire population. Since human generations begin with Adam and Eve, each 
'carriers' of the penalties, the entire human race through all its succeeding 
generations will likewise have these penalties. Nor are they neutral traits, 
but 'damages' of a recognizable sort. Consider hemophilia, an inherited 
trait resulting in a 'damaged' human, that is, someone whose blood fails 
to clot properly. If hemophilia were to afflict both sexes equally, were 
strongly dominant, and were sufficiently widespread in the population, 
it might happen that succeeding generations would consist exclusively of 
active hemophiliacs.14 It is as though the penalties of sin were inflicted as 
genetic damage on Adam and Eve, and thereby passed along to the rest 
of humanity. The 'necessity' required for (S) would then be biological, or 
broadly speaking physical, necessity; all human beings after Adam and 
Eve would exhibit these traits because of the nature of the trait and the 
mechanisms of inheritance. Human nature would then have been dam­
aged by the presence of these heritable deleterious properties, unavoid­
able and objectionable as they are.15
Is it plausible to think of the penalties of sin as genetically heritable? 
Augustine thought so. Take ignorance. We know now that intelligence is a 
weakly inherited trait, so it is easy to imagine some artificial manipulation 
of intelligence that affects succeeding generations—if intelligence were 
universally lowered it might never get quite so high again. This is not quite 
the same as Augustine's claim that fallen humans are specially ignorant of 
right and wrong, but it is close enough (and Augustine is vague enough) to 
make it not unreasonable. It is even easier to make the case for disease and 
death; we only have to imagine that Adam and Eve had an additional in­
gredient in their physiologies that made their bodies particularly resilient, 
tough, and regenerative, so that they would never wear out—whereas we 
have lost the ability to synthesize this extra ingredient, just as hemophiliacs 
have lost the common ability to synthesize blood clotting factors due to 
genetic abnormalities. Now we are most likely to part company with Au­
gustine over lust. Being prey to strong and unruly desires is not obviously 
a heritable trait, and it is hard to imagine adult humans without sexuality, 
ambition, or any other drive.16 Yet Augustine again finds sexual desire es­
pecially revealing on this score, since the genetic inheritance model relies 
on physiological means of transmission—in the case of human beings sex­
ual intercourse—which is inevitably spurred on and accompanied by raw 
libido, even in marriage (nupt. et conc. 1.24.27). Something of unbridled pas­
sion in the act of sexual intercourse is thereby imparted to the offspring,17 
rendering its own desires, when developed, strong and unruly, thereby
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passing along the third penalty of sin. Even lust, then, might arguably be 
thought—at least by Augustine—to conform to the genetic inheritance 
model. Whatever we may think of his reasons for taking the penalties of 
sin to be transmissible, there is no question that he thought they were, and 
so present in all the descendants of Adam and Eve by a kind of necessity. 
He could therefore conclude by (S) that they are features of human nature: 
more exactly, that they have become features of human nature, to our sor­
row. Thus human nature has changed in at least these respects.
Guilt, however, is not readily susceptible to this approach. The sins of 
the fathers are not those of the sons; moral transgression is neither heri­
table nor physiologically transmissible. Adam and Eve may have been sin­
ners, and their children may yet sin, but the children of Adam and Eve 
have not eaten of the forbidden fruit, and so seem innocent of the "ancient 
sin." (Furthermore, given their innocence, it seems wrong that they inherit 
the penalties of sin.) Original guilt must necessarily affect all humans in 
some other fashion.
Augustine often speaks of original guilt as involving a debt (debitum). 
At first glance this looks promising: debts can be 'inherited,' so that the 
heirs and assigns of an estate can be responsible for discharging the con­
tractual obligations left outstanding at the death of the principal. Yet this 
will not do as an account of original guilt. For debts are charged against 
an estate, not against the heirs themselves; it is reasonable to pay off con­
tractual obligations before disbursing the estate, so that the heirs receive 
an appropriately diminished estate, but not reasonable to treat the heirs 
simply as though they had incurred the debt. They did not. The estate, or 
perhaps by extension its heirs, may be liable for the debt, but the heirs are 
not thereby guilty of anything.18 Repayment of a debt is not punishment 
but compensation; that is precisely the point of the distinction between 
criminal law and civil law.19 Furthermore, there is no clear sense in which 
we have an 'estate' passed along from Adam, against which any such debt 
could be charged. Hence the legal analogy with debt cannot serve to ex­
plain original guilt. To his credit, Augustine does not spend much time on 
it, calling on the analogy mostly for rhetorical purposes.
Augustine instead appeals to the distinction between committing a sin 
and being in a sinful state, noted above. Committing a sin is a sufficient con­
dition for being in a sinful state; forgiveness is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of release from a sinful state. (There are complicated questions 
about how forgiveness is related to punishment.) Furthermore, Augustine 
insists that free choice of the will is a necessary condition for committing 
a sin: "There can be no sin that is not voluntary; the ignorant and the 
learned alike admit this truth" (ver. rel. 14.27). He also holds that human 
infants are in a sinful state in virtue of original guilt prior to any act of will 
on their part. These last two claims are consistent if we deny that commit­
ting a sin is a necessary condition for being in a sinful state. This is the tack 
Augustine takes to explain original guilt.20 Adam and Eve are in a sinful 
state as a result of committing "the ancient sin" in Eden. Without per­
sonally committing that sin, their descendants nevertheless share in their 
sinful state by having a special relation to Adam and Eve, namely being 
identical with them in some sense.21 Just what sense of identity is at stake 
was a question Augustine never resolved. He offers two approaches.
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First, Augustine suggests that we are "one in Adam" as his descendants: 
the human race is one by having a single source from which it has sprung. 
But this notion of identity-in-descent just renames the problem. While it 
is true that Adam is our common ancestor, that does not explain how we 
'are' Adam in any sense relevant to original guilt. To this end Augustine 
proposes that we are somehow literally contained in Adam and therefore 
are identical with him (pecc. mer. 3.7.14):
Everyone sinned in Adam when they still all were that one man in
his nature, due to the power residing in him which made him able
to produce them.
This is more than the point that Adam's descendants are descended from 
Adam, and even more than the claim that Adam has all of his descendants 
'in him' in potency. Augustine is a realist and a reductionist about mo­
dality. He holds that there must be something metaphysically present in 
Adam from which everything that arises from him is already contained— 
his version of the Stoic arceppaTixoi Aoyoi, the theory of rationes seminales 
expounded at length in his literal commentary on Genesis. Each human 
being descended from Adam (which is to say every human being) is thus 
contained in Adam in a metaphysically robust sense, "in his nature" as 
Augustine says, so as to be part of the 'unfolding program' that is a ratio 
seminalis. All the generations of the human race are metaphysically pres­
ent in Adam at once, "one in Adam." Call this the 'containment theory.'22
Yet even if we grant Augustine the containment theory and talk of each 
human being as 'in' Adam, we do not yet have the relevant identity need­
ed to explain original guilt. Adam may commit a sin and thus enter a sin­
ful state whilst I am in him, but this does not entail that I enter that sinful 
state as well, much less that I remain in it when I am born outside of Adam 
in my proper generation. Adam may be sinful without a part of him being 
sinful, just as the finger of a liar is not thereby a liar. Augustine recognizes 
the point, but simply insists that we are identical with Adam in virtue of 
being contained in him, which sidesteps the difficulty rather than solving 
it.23 And without an explanation, there is no reason to think that we share 
Adam's sinful state, and hence no reason to think that human nature was 
altered in the Fall. No wonder he found this approach unsatisfactory.
The second approach is found only in hints and suggestions in Augus­
tine's works, from conf. 10.10.29 onwards, and may be termed the 'double 
life' theory.24 Apparently we lead not one but two lives, one common and 
the other individual: we exist and share in a common life in Adam, and we 
also exist and have a personal life beginning with birth (or strictly speak­
ing ensoulment); we acquire the second, personal, life without losing the 
first common life. When Adam committed his "ancient sin" we were all 
alive in him and not yet with our separate (personal) lives: separatim uiuens 
(ep. 98.1). Instead, we were one in him and with him, not having personal 
lives (propria uita). Our souls seem to be indistinctly common in the com­
mon life, in some sense pre-existent, but not yet "leading their personal 
lives": qui suas et proprias uitas agerent (ep. 190). Their individual personal­
ity differentiates souls, but not at the expense of unity in Adam as soul or 
life; individual distinctness is compatible with shared commonness.
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The ultimate provenance of the double-life theory may be Plato's ac­
count of the World-Soul in the Timaeus, though Augustine's source is much 
more likely to be some version of Plotinus's account of the hypostasis Soul 
in relation to individual souls.25 Talk of 'Adam' would go proxy for God's 
creation of the relevant hypostasis, in this case Human Life, and can also 
be taken literally, referring to Adam's personal life. In Paradise the whole 
of Human Life would be in Adam,26 so that his personal life literally was 
the common and universal life. When Adam sinned, then, the whole of 
Human Life was "suffused with original guilt" (Simpl. 1.2.20). To the ex­
tent that every human being has a common life, each soul will thenceforth 
be tainted with original guilt.27 Augustine was notoriously undecided 
about the possible pre-existence of the soul; the double-life theory allows 
him to eat his cake and have it too by maintaining the existence of Soul but 
not of personal souls. It also provides an explanation of how original guilt 
affects humans after Adam's sin, as required. That's enough for (S).
The sticking-point on the second approach is the terrible obscurity of 
the metaphysics that are supposed to support the double-life theory, espe- 
dally the peculiar relation of the one Human Life to the many individual 
lives. It is no news that Augustine was influenced by platonism, but he 
owes us an explanation of the details if they are taken to support as impor­
tant a doctrine as the Doctrine of Original Sin. Again he seems dissatisfied 
with this approach, never developing it even to the point sketched here. 
It is suggestive, but no more; and with the passing of classical antiquity 
in the Latin West, Augustine's brand of neoplatonic speculation had little 
future. It was left to later generations to find an acceptable way of explain­
ing the transmission of original guilt.
2. Anselm, Odo, and Pseudo-Joscelin
Augustine's failure to provide an adequate theory underlying the Doctrine 
of Original Sin cast a long shadow. It was not until the close of the eleventh 
century that treatises devoted solely to the question were again written, 
and then two were produced almost at the same time, ca. 1100: the De con- 
ceptu uirginali et de originali peccato by Anselm of Canterbury, and the De 
peccato originali by Odo of Tournai. They both adopt the framework of the 
problem as laid down by Augustine—they could hardly do otherwise— 
but with modifications. I'll focus on Anselm, the better philosopher.
Anselm begins with a metaphysical thesis about the composition of hu­
man beings (conc. uirg. 1):28
Together in every human being there are (a) the nature, by which he 
is a human being like all others; (b) the person, by which he is distinct 
from others, for instance when one is called 'this fellow' or 'that one', 
or by a proper name such as 'Adam' or 'Abel'.
Some properties pertain primarily to the (individual) person and others 
to the (common) nature; they are personal or 'nature-al' (a. k. a. 'original') 
properties. The one may affect the other, Anselm notes: sicut personale tran­
sit ad naturam, ita naturale ad personam (conc. uirg. 23). Adam's human na­
ture required him, the person, to eat, since his nature was created to need
256 Faith and Philosophy
to eat. Yet Adam's choice to eat the forbidden fruit does not stem from his 
nature; it is instead a personal choice, "although what a person does isn't 
accomplished without his nature" (quod tamen egit persona non fecit sine 
natura), to be sure (conc. uirg. 23).29 Most sin will be personal, and personal 
alone; Adam's sin has the distinctive feature of being a 'natural' ('original') 
sin as well—his personal sin affects his nature. Let's see how this works.
Anselm accepts Augustine's account of the penalties of sin. However, 
he offers a different explanation of original guilt. According to Anselm, 
Adam and Eve were created having 'perfect justice' (conc. uirg. 2), that 
is, uprightness of the will preserved for its own sake (conc. uirg. 3). As a 
feature of human nature this is something Adam and Eve ought to have. 
When Adam sinned, he forfeited his uprightness of will, having done 
what he ought not; his state of sin therefore consists in a dual condition: 
not having perfect justice on the one hand, and being obliged to have it on 
the other hand (conc. uirg. 2). A sinful state is thus a kind of deficiency, the 
absence of a positive feature that ought to be present. Hence Adam com­
mitted a sin (for which blame and punishment are appropriate) and there­
by put himself in a 'defective' state, lacking perfect justice. Now here's the 
trick. Since Adam lost his original uprightness of will, he didn't have it to 
pass along to his descendants; Augustine's worries about the mechanism 
for transmission are misguided—the point is that Adam didn't have what 
he ought to have had to pass along, and so his descendants all lack the 
same feature (conc. uirg. 23):30
To be sure, what made [infants] not have the justice they ought to 
is not their personal will, as in the case of Adam, but a deficiency 
in their nature (egestas naturalis) which the nature itself got from 
Adam. For [human] nature was in Adam and none of it outside him; 
stripped of the justice it had, it always lacks it (unless it receives [di­
vine] assistance). Accordingly, since the nature subsists in persons 
and persons do not exist without the nature, the nature makes the 
persons of infants sinful. Thus in the case of Adam did a person de­
prive the nature of the good that is justice, and the nature rendered 
deficient makes all the persons whom it procreates from itself sin­
ners by the same deficiency.
The damage suffered by human nature isn't a positive feature but a defi­
ciency, a lack, much the way an automobile can be damaged by losing a 
part. Furthermore, Anselm continues, the defective state in which Adam's 
descendants find themselves is not a matter of their committing a sin to 
be in that state, as was the case with Adam; hence infants who die be­
fore capable of committing sins of their own suffer a milder condemna­
tion than they would otherwise (conc. uirg. 23). However, the deficiency 
for which they are condemned—not having the uprightness of will they 
ought to have—makes it inevitable that they will in turn commit sins of 
their own, of which they will be guilty; hence guilt is a necessary feature 
of postlapsarian human nature and affects each human being personally 
(conc. uirg. 7).
Anselm's account of the inner workings of sin pays the price of giving 
up something Augustine thought essential to the Doctrine of Original Sin,
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namely the claim that each human being is "from the moment of birth" 
literally in a sinful state-guilt in the strong sense. Anselm has replaced 
Augustinian original guilt with two factors: (a) a deficiency in human na­
ture, the lack of something that should be present, due to Adam's loss of 
original justice; (b) the assured inevitability of personal sin, due to the de­
ficiency in human nature. Whether (a)-(b) are jointly sufficient for original 
guilt is by no means clear. Nor is the damage suffered by human nature 
quite the same. For Augustine, human nature is itself in a permanent state 
of sin, whereas for Anselm human nature is deficient and doomed to sin. 
Anselm insists that the deficiency is a moral failing on the grounds that 
human nature lacks something it ought to have (debitum). But this runs 
into the objection noted above with respect to inherited liability, namely 
that debt is not guilt and compensation not punishment.
There is a deeper metaphysical problem with Anselm's account. Even 
if we grant that (a)-(b) are a satisfactory explanation of original guilt, a 
point that can be left to the theologians, Anselm cannot simply dismiss 
the demand for an explanation of its transmission. Grant that Adam's per­
sonal sin caused him to lose 9 , so that he did not have 9  to pass along. 
This explains Abel's lack of 9  only if Abel could get 9  from Adam. On the 
other hand, if Adam and Eve had not sinned, their descendants would 
also have original justice, as they themselves did (conc. uirg. 10). The up­
shot is that Anselm takes the presence or absence of original justice to be 
a heritable trait.31 Otherwise, its presence (or its absence as a deficiency) 
in Adam's descendants stands in need of explanation, which Anselm does 
not provide. Human nature is present in every human being, but unless 
we know more about how it is (or comes to be) present in every human be­
ing, whether damaged or not, we will not understand why human beings 
are as they are. And that returns us to the question with which we began. 
What is human nature such that it can be changed as a result of human 
choices and actions?
Anselm's official answer to this question is more or less Augustine's 
answer, explicated by (S): human nature consists in features that affect all 
human beings, roughly the essence and the propria. But there are traces 
of an alternate answer in Anselm, an answer that tantalizingly hints at a 
subversive approach to metaphysics. Look again at Anselm's claim that if 
Adam and Eve had not sinned their descendants would also have original 
justice. Yet Adam and Eve did sin, and their descendants are afflicted with 
original guilt and the penalties of sin. What if Eve sinned but Adam did 
not? Anselm says that only Eve "and not the whole human race" would 
be lost, for God could create from Adam another woman and they could 
reproduce sinlessly (conc. uirg. 9).32 Put aside the doctrinal issue for the 
moment and focus on Anselm's reasoning. What is true of human nature 
depends, at least in part, on what is true of the several individual human 
beings. To put the point suggestively, human nature seems to depend on 
what is true of human beings collectively.
With this thought in mind, consider Anselm's description of original sin 
(conc. uirg. 2):33
Since the whole of human nature was in them and none of it was
outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted.
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Elsewhere, speaking of Adam, Anselm says that "by his defeat the whole 
of human [nature] (tota humana) was corrupted and leavened, so to speak, 
with sin" (cur deus homo 1.23). A similar suggestion is found in Odo of 
Tournai (pecc. or. 3 1088C):34
If Adam sinned, man sinned. For if this man sinned, human nature, 
which is man, sinned. But at that time the whole of human nature 
was in him, and nowhere else was there man as species. Thus when 
the person (namely this man) sinned, the nature as a whole (namely 
man as common) sinned.
The emphasis in Anselm and in Odo is on human nature as a kind of 
whole, a whole we identify by enumerating its 'parts,' namely Adam and 
Eve ("none of it was outside them"). The subversive idea hiding in An­
selm's and Odo's apparently ordinary remarks is the notion that human 
nature is the collective whole made up of individual human beings—that 
we look to individuals to ground claims about the nature. If that is correct, 
then the nature is in some appropriate sense posterior to the individual, 
for the nature depends on what individuals are collectively like.
To appreciate the radical character of this idea, take another look at (S), 
Augustine's simplifying assumption: anything that must hold of all hu­
mans is thereby part of human nature. The 'must' in (S) serves to restrict 
our attention to propria, to necessary if not essential features of human na­
ture, where the omnipresence of a feature is a reasonably good guide to its 
necessity. Yet there is no reason why the interesting features of a given nat­
ural kind are restricted to strictly necessary properties. It is an important 
feature about human beings that most are right-handed, that we usually 
have ten fingers and ten toes, that we have reached the Moon, and that we 
don't live in Antarctica. To take the point a step further: human nature is in 
a matter of our typical behaviour, activities, surroundings, and so on. We 
discover what human nature is by looking at human beings collectively, 
since what we are is a matter of how we all are. Hence we should replace 
(S) with a thesis that makes this idea explicit:
(S*) Whatever is typical of the members of a species is part of the spe­
cific nature.
According to (S*), the specific nature is not a pre-existent abstract entity, 
but rather something constructed from the individual members of the 
species in question. This is a conception of 'nature' that allows historical 
change with a vengeance: any relevant shift sufficiently widespread in the 
species will be a shift in the nature. That is because there is no more to the 
species than the characteristics of its members.
The conception of 'specific nature' sketched here is not at home in meta­
physics. Instead, it is closer to the way in which a biologist, not a metaphy­
sician, speaks of genera and species (which is the only usage of 'genus' and 
'species' left standing today). The beaver, the biologist tells us, is a flour­
ishing species; the New World beaver ranges from northern Mexico to the 
Arctic, living in colonies around streams, rivers, and forest-edged lakes; 
the beaver builds dome-shaped island lodges of sticks plastered with mud; 
the beaver has a lifespan of seven to twenty years; and so on. The species
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exists in and through its current members, which is why it makes sense to 
talk about a (biological) species becoming extinct. Beavers do not cease to 
be beavers even if they are taken out of their typical habitats; a beaver air­
lifted to the Sahara desert would still be a beaver, though perhaps it would 
not survive for long. If enough beavers adapt to desert living, though, we 
might be tempted to say that beavers live in wetlands and in deserts—the 
nature of the species has changed, through our intervention (airlifting bea­
vers to the Sahara) and biological adaptation. As with beavers and their 
habitats, so with all species; the nature of a species is determined by the 
collection of its members. Biology is metaphysics naturalized.
This line of thought is admittedly no more than a tantalizing sugges­
tion in Anselm and Odo, but it emerges full-blown in the next generation. 
An anonymous author known as 'Pseudo-Joscelin,' from a remark in John 
of Salisbury,35 wrote a treatise De generibus et speciebus in the first decades 
of the twelfth century in which he proposes that genera and species are 
collections of their members. Pseudo-Joscelin argues that the biological 
conception of genera and species, as outlined above, is the best account 
of genera and species available, and that it does all the work the meta­
physician wanted to do with genera and species—at least, all the work 
reported in Porphyry and Boethius, the core of metaphysical knowledge 
at the time. Much of his treatise is given over to exposition and defence of 
his view (gen. et spec. §85):36
Hence I say that the species is not merely the essence man in Socrates 
or in some other individual man, but rather it is the whole collec­
tion produced from them as its material. That is, the species is one 
thing—a 'flock', so to speak—conjoined from the essence man that 
Socrates sustains, along with each of the other [essences] of this na­
ture. This whole collection, even though it is essentially many, is nev­
ertheless called 'one species' and 'one universal' and 'one nature' by 
the authorities, just as the populace is called 'one' even though it is 
collected from many persons.
The species is technically the collection of individual specific forms from 
each member, according to Pseudo-Joscelin; this provides an intensional 
way to distinguish extensionally identical collections, as might happen if 
only beavers survived a plague affecting all animals; we could neverthe­
less distinguish the species beaver from the genus animal by recourse to 
their distinct individualized forms.
Pseudo-Joscelin was taken to task for his views by Peter Abelard, who 
roundly criticizes the idea, but whose criticism consists largely of point­
ing out that biological collections do not logically function the way well- 
behaved integral wholes should. But Pseudo-Joscelin is willing to accept 
some counterintuitive consequences of his view, e. g. that the species 
'changes' when its members change, as part of the biological conception 
of natures (gen. et spec. §113):37
Now pay attention: it's true that the humanity that existed a thou­
sand years ago, or yesterday, is not what exists today. But it is never­
theless the same as the latter—that is, not of dissimilar creation. For
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it is not the case that whatever is the same as another is identical to 
it. . . . Socrates too consists in many more atoms as a man than as a 
boy, and yet he is the same.
The members of the species certainly change, so it is not literally identi­
cal over time. Nevertheless, we do identify it as the same species, on the 
grounds that its members are "not of dissimilar creation": born in the same 
way of the same kind of parents, that is, a suggestion reminiscent of the 
modern biological conception of a species as a group made up of members 
that can reproduce functional offspring. Once the species is recognized to 
be both the same and different, and the respects in which each holds true, 
there is nothing more to add.
Pseudo-Joscelin is clear that the collection of individual that make up 
a species is not arbitrary. He images the case in which there are only ten 
human beings, and someone asks whether a subcollection would count as 
a species (gen. et spec. §§122-123):38
Yet if anyone were to object that therefore what is constituted out 
of five members is a species, for it materially inheres in many, reply 
as follows: This is irrelevant, for [the subcollection] is not a nature, 
and only natures are in question here. If you should inquire what 
a 'nature' is, listen: I call a nature whatever is of dissimilar creation 
from all those that are not either it or belonging to it, whether it be 
one or several. For example, Socrates is of dissimilar creation from 
all those who are not Socrates. Likewise, the species man is of dis­
similar creation from all things that are not that species or a member 
of that species. And this is not suitable for any given subcollection of 
human beings, since it is not of dissimilar creation from the others 
who are in that species.
A nature consists of everything that shares a common origin, and is set 
apart by that origin. The collection of members will change over time, and 
as the characteristics of the members change so too does the nature they 
defines, though the collection does not define a different nature simply in 
virtue of having different members.
For Pseudo-Joscelin, as for the modern biologist, the species exists in 
and through (all) its (current) members. That is what allows us to make 
claims about the species as a whole in virtue of only some of its members, 
such as "The human race has reached the Moon." The species is in a way 
'wholly present' in any of its members (gen. et spec. §93):39
However, I say that humanity does inhere in Socrates—not that the 
whole is used up in Socrates; rather, only one part of it is informed 
with Socrateity. This is how I am said to touch a wall. It isn't that 
each of my parts is in contact with the wall. Maybe only the tip of my 
finger does. But by this contact I am said to touch it.
Socrates is both a member of the collection that makes up humanity, and a 
representative of that species, so that truths about Socrates are also truths 
about the species to which he belongs (and conversely). Although couched
HUMAN NATURE AND ORIGINAL SIN 261
in the language of metaphysics, Pseudo-Joscelin's biological conception 
of natures subverts traditional metaphysics, since it locates the objects of 
study in collections of individuals out in the world, rather than in essences 
contemplated from the safe haven of the metaphysician's armchair. Pseu- 
do-Joscelin makes no mention of the Doctrine of Original Sin in his short 
treatise, occupied as he is with taking on traditional metaphysics; but the 
groundwork for his position was laid by Anselm and Odo, in the sugges­
tive hints they offered while wrestling with the equally knotty problem of 
original guilt.
Epilogue: Aquinas and High Scholasticism
Attractive as the biological conception of natures may be, at least to our 
modern sensibilities, it didn't catch on. We hear no more about it after the 
middle of the twelfth century. Part of the explanation is undoubtedly the 
tidal wave of Latin translations of Aristotle; when the dust finally settled on 
the codices, the innovative works of the twelfth century had been eclipsed 
by the technicalities of Aristotelian philosophy. Yet the philosophers of 
High Scholasticism were as committed as ever to the Doctrine of Original 
Sin, as well as to the authority of Augustine. Hence they also faced the 
challenge of making sense of the idea that human nature was damaged 
in the course of time, literally changing for the worse in the Fall, roughly 
along the lines of the genetic inheritance model. Rather than follow up 
on the biological conception of natures, though, they opted to explain the 
transmission of original guilt through the traditional metaphysical notion 
of a single shared human nature. This traditional notion was expanded 
not through biological considerations, but through a 'corporatist' account 
of humanity combined with an emphasis on Anselm's account of original 
sin as a kind of deficiency.
Aquinas will serve as an impeccably orthodox illustration. After endors­
ing Augustine's view that the guilt of original sin is transmitted from Adam 
to his descendants "by way of origin," Aquinas presents at length in sum. 
theol. 1a2ae.81.1 his new model for understanding how this happens:40
We should take another route [to explain original sin], holding that 
all men born of Adam can be considered as one man, insofar as they 
agree in their nature, which they take from the First Parent-just 
as in the social realm all who belong to one community are held as 
though one body, and the whole community as though one man. 
Porphyry also says that many men are one man by participation in 
the species. This is how many men, descended from Adam, are then 
as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of 
the body, such as the hand, is not voluntary by the hand's own will, 
but rather by the soul's will which primarily moves the members. 
Accordingly, a murder that the hand commits is not imputed to the 
hand as a sin (if the hand were considered in itself as divided from 
the body), but instead is imputed to it inasmuch as it is something 
belonging to a man and which is moved by the primary motive prin­
ciple of the man. Hence this is the way the disorderliness in this man, 
born of Adam, is not voluntary by his will, but by the will of the
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First Parent, who moves with the movement of generation all those 
who originate from him, just as the soul's will moves all the [bodily] 
members to action. Accordingly, the sin derived from the First Par­
ent in his descendants in this manner is called 'original', the way 
the sin derived from the soul with respect to the bodily members 
is called 'actual'. And just as the actual sin committed by a bodily 
member is the sin of that member only inasmuch as that member is 
something belonging to this man, and so is called a 'human sin', so 
too original sin is a sin of this person only inasmuch as this person 
takes his nature from the First Parent, whereby it is called a "sin of 
the nature."
Aquinas proposes that we stand in a double relation to Adam. On the one 
hand, as Adam's descendants we are human, deriving our nature from 
his. On the other hand, Adam stands to all his descendants, in virtue of the 
fact that they are his descendants, as their 'corporate head' whose actions 
call responsibility on all equally. The analogy is with the body politic. Our 
metaphysically shared human nature qualifies us for membership in the 
human community, rendering us liable to individual guilt for our collec­
tive misdeed (through the action of Adam as our 'leader' so to speak), the 
way in which one might hold each and every German of the time guilty 
of Hitler's evils. Aquinas sums up his approach pithily: "A man may be 
under a family disgrace from birth, brought about by the misdeed of some 
ancestor" (sum. theol. 1a.2ae.81.1 ad 5).41
The Fall itself consisted in God's withdrawal of grace from Adam and 
Eve. The prelapsarian condition was one in which human nature was sur­
rounded by God's grace and thus supernaturally made immortal,42 wise, 
and able to act rightly; the postlapsarian condition one in which justifying 
grace is absent (sum. theol. 1a2ae.109.7 and 3a.87.2 ad 3). Citing Anselm, 
Aquinas holds that the 'formal' element in original sin is the privation of 
original justice, which itself is a gift of grace (sum. theol. 1a2ae.83.2 ad 2). 
Aquinas agrees with Anselm that such a privation is not strictly speaking 
a case of sin, since no individual act of volition need be present for some­
one to have original sin. On the 'corporate' analogy, Adam has literally 
sinned for each one of us. Aquinas maintains that original sin is therefore 
called 'sin' analogically (sent. 2.25.1 art. 2 ad 2).
Aquinas's account of original sin, with its synthesis of Augustine and 
Anselm, clearly abandons the biological conception of natures. Whether 
it is a better theory is a question that can be put aside here. It is enough 
for our purposes to note that the tantalizing suggestions found in Anselm 
and Odo are passed over in favor of the traditional metaphysical under­
standing of natures. Aquinas is merely representative on this score. To the 
best of my knowledge, no mediaeval philosopher after the middle of the 
twelfth century takes the biological conception of nature seriously. Medi­
eval metaphysics can therefore proceed untroubled by the spectre of biol­
ogy. It is one of the great lost possibilities in the history of metaphysics.
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NOTES
1. The Biblical account, found in Gen. 3, is given a distinctive Christian 
twist in Rom. 5:1-2 and 1 Cor. 15:21-22.
2. See Pier Beatrice, Tradux peccati: Alle fonte della dottrina agostiniana del pec- 
cato originale (Milano: Vita e pensiero 1978) for Augustine's sources and his use 
of them. To his analysis I would add two antecedents likely to have influenced 
Augustine: the classical understanding of u|3qlc; and pidapa on the one hand, 
and the neoplatonic view of 'descent into the body' (enn. 4.8) on the other.
3. See, for instance, his De nuptiis et concupiscentia, De peccatorum meritis et 
remissione, De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, De correptione et gratia, Contra 
Iulianum, and other polemical writings; discussions of the Doctrine of Original 
Sin even spill over into the De ciuitate Dei and the Enchiridion.
4. “Nam et superbia est illic, qua homo in sua potius esse quam in Dei po- 
testate dilexit; et sacrilegium quia Deo non credidit; et homicidium quoniam 
se praecipitauit in mortem; et fornicatio spiritalis, quoniam integritas mentis 
humanae serpentina suasione corrupta est; et furtum, quia cibus prohibitus 
usurpatus est; et auaritia, quia plus quam sufficere illi debuit appetiuit, et si 
quid aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti consideratione inueniri potest." Here 
and throughout this article, all translations are mine.
5. “Unde illo magno primi hominis peccato, natura ibi nostra in deterius 
commutata, non solum est facta peccatrix, uerum etiam genuit peccatores."
6. Augustine's term 'uitiata' is etymologically connected with 'uitium' (vice 
or defect), and usually has the overtones of moral degradation or corruption.
7. “[C]ontagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere": ep. 217 
5.16.
8. “Totius humani generis massa damnata": ench. 8.27. Augustine repeats 
the phrase with minor variations in many places, for instance Simpl. 1.2.16. 
The 'lump' alludes to Rom. 9:21, where Paul describes the human race as a 
lump of clay that God moulds as He sees fit.
9. Augustine's account of the penalties for original sin is already found in 
lib. arb. 3 (where lust is called 'difficulty'), and repeated widely thereafter; see, 
for instance, civ. 14.15.
10. Sexual arousal is not merely a physiological phenomenon, though it 
may be that in part. Augustine recognizes the emotional and mental compo­
nents of arousal as integral to human sexuality, even though he wants no part 
of them.
11. In our prelapsarian condition, our sexual organs were completely un­
der our conscious control, and sexual activity free of libido, as Augustine tells 
us in civ. 14.23-24.
12. Augustine's theories of original guilt and of death as a penalty of sin 
were confirmed at the Council of Carthage (418), at the second Council of Or­
ange (529), and again in the decree on original sin of the Council of Trent (17 
June 1546).
13. Note that propria are not the same as inseparable accidents, which may 
also be present in each member of a species, nor able to be removed once 
present, but do not have to be present. The classical example of such an in­
separable accident is the blackness found in ravens. It is not a proprium since 
it is found in things other than ravens, and no necessity would be violated in 
the existence of a non-black raven. The distinction between propria and insepa­
rable accidents is subtle but important.
14. We at least have the hope of genetic mutation and adaptive pressure, 
to say nothing of genetic engineering, to forestall such a future. Augustine had 
neither, since he found it reasonable to suppose that only God can undo what 
only God can do.
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15. We may find it particularly difficult to see how a just God could allow 
such 'penalties' to assail later descendants—that is, we may be led to question 
the morality of inflicting genetic damage on offenders. Augustine's answer is 
that God is not vengeful, since these descendants are not themselves innocent, 
and hence merit punishment in their own right. That depends, however, on 
his case for original guilt being transmitted, and as we shall see this is by no 
means obvious (nor did Augustine himself think so). The question is a matter 
for the morals of the Doctrine of Original Sin rather than for its metaphysics, 
however, so I will shelve it.
16. Augustine also finds it hard to imagine, as “full of turmoil" (discordio- 
sum) as we are now: ciu. 14.10. See also Appendix 3 of John Rist, Augustine: 
Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge University Press 1994).
17. Augustine holds that prenatal events, and conception most of all, can 
affect the child in the womb. He argues for this position extensively in his last 
works against Julian. This view clearly shows the traces of folk-belief, of a 
piece with such 'wisdom' as the idea that the woman's looking at a picture of 
a handsome man during sexual intercourse will cause her child to be hand­
some. Even if we grant Augustine these folk-beliefs, however, his account 
doesn't generalize to non-sexual lusts.
18. Christopher Kirwan makes a similar point in his Augustine (London: 
Routledge 1989), p. 137. We might also raise questions about the morality of 
imposing a debt as punishment that the estate or the heir would never be able 
to pay, to say nothing about whether this was understood to be part of the 
punishment for violating God's command.
19. Note however that 'punitive damages,' though not a legal notion, 
makes civil compensation much more like criminal punishment. (The practise 
of imposing fines as criminal punishment also blurs the line.) Yet the main 
distinction between guilt and liability is clear, and Augustine recognizes it.
20. The obvious though morally distasteful analogy for Augustine should 
be slavery. Someone who became a slave would normally remain one unless 
explicitly manumitted by the one to whom he is enslaved; any children of 
a slave are themselves slaves, and are born that way—there is nothing they 
need to do to enter the state of slavery. There might be many ways of becom­
ing a slave, including being sentenced to slavery as a form of punishment. The 
difficult point of analogy to work out is why sinful status should be passed 
along, the way slave status is.
21. Augustine is helped to this view by his faulty text of Rom. 5:1-2, which,
like the Vulgate, reads “per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intra- 
vit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit in quo omnes 
peccaverunt": Augustine identifies the in quo as Adam (pecc. mer. 1.10.11), and 
understands the passage to assert our sinful condition via identity with Adam. 
Ambrosiaster understood it likewise. But the Greek text reads w, introduc­
ing an explanatory clause, and cannot bear this interpretation.
22. The containment theory is close to the genetic inheritance model, in 
that Adam's descendants have a feature in virtue of being descended from 
Adam, but is based on a different kind of explanation. For the genetic inheri­
tance model, a trait is transmitted from each generation to the next by some 
physiological means, so that the possession of the trait is explained in pair­
wise stages along a chain back to Adam. For the containment theory, guilt is 
passed along to Adam's descendants in virtue of their being literally 'in' Adam 
when he entered a state of sin.
23. There is a slightly weaker position available to Augustine. He could 
maintain not that we are identical with Adam, but that Adam's sinful state 
'permeates' all his parts, so that any part of Adam is affected by it. Think of 
being 'It' in the game of Tag—any part of It's body is such that being touched
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by that part counts as being tagged by It; the 'Itness' of It is present in all of 
It's bodily parts. Analogously, Adam's sinfulness is such that it affects all his 
parts, including our inchoate selves. Aquinas's 'corporate' account, described 
at the end of this article, has some affinities with this weaker position.
24. I am indebted to John Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cam­
bridge University Press 1994) pp. 121-129 for this second approach, which he 
develops from the pioneering work of A. Solignac, “La condition de l'homme 
pecheur d'apres saint Augustin" in Nouvelle revue theologique 78 (1956), pp. 
359-387.
25. See for instance enn. 4.3.27, where the issue comes up in discussing the 
nature of memory, a topic of great interest to Augustine.
26. Conveniently putting Eve aside. Augustine thinks that we are entitled 
to do so on the grounds that Eve's creation from Adam's rib shows that her life 
is a shared part of his. Anselm holds likewise (conc. uirg. 9).
27. Augustine holds that in general personal sin affects Human Life. Later 
sins, or the sins of later generations, do not change human nature because you 
can only break the window once: civ. 14.12.
28. “Licet enim in unoqunque homine simul sint et natura qua est homo, 
sicut sunt omnes alii, et persona qua discernitur ab aliis, ut cum dicitur 'iste' 
uel 'ille', siue proprio nomine, ut Adam aut Abel." See also inc. Verb. 11.
29. Odo of Tournai uses the same terminology of personal and 'natural' 
sin, and asserts that “because the person is not without the nature, the sin of 
the person is also a sin of the nature" (sed quia persona non est sine natura, peca- 
tum personae est etiam naturae): pecc. or. 2 1085B.
30. “Nempe quod in illis non est iustitia quam debent habere, non hoc fecit 
illorum uoluntas personalis, sicut in Adam, sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa 
natura accepit ab Adam. In Adam namque, extra quem de illa nihil erat, est 
nudata iustitia quam habebat, et ea semper nisi adinta caret. Hac ratione quon­
dam natura subsistit in personis et personae non sunt sine natura, facit natura 
personas infantum peccatrices. Sic spoliauit persona naturam bono iustitiae in 
Adam, et natura egens facta omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem 
egestate peccatrices et iniustas facit." Odo of Tournai also describes Adam's 
sin as a case “of the soul that ought to have justice freely abandoning it" (pecc. 
or. 2).
31. How could Anselm think that a deficiency is heritable? Perhaps it has 
to do with the relative strength of the 'affections' of the will, namely the will- 
to-happiness and the will-to-justice; as physical strength might be passed on 
from father to son, so too 'moral fiber.'
32. In the spirit of Anselm's reply, we could image Adam and Eve sinlessly 
having Jack and Jill, and only then committing “the ancient sin": the descen­
dants of Adam and Eve would be afflicted with original sin, the descendants 
of Jack and Jill sinless. That raises the question of interbreeding; Anselm's re­
marks about God's having to create another woman for Adam were Eve alone 
to sin suggest that original guilt is a strongly dominant trait. Aquinas argues 
that dominance is a feature of the parent's gender, not the trait in itself, so that 
if Adam were to sin but not Eve their children would be blighted with original 
sin, whereas if Eve were to sin but not Adam their children would be free of it 
(sum. theol. 1a.2ae.81.5).
33. “Et quia tota humana natura in illis erat et extra ipsos de illa nihil erat, 
tota infirmata et corrupta est." See also conc. uirg. 10: “humana natura quae sic 
erat in Adam tota ut nihil de illa extra illum esset."
34. “Et si peccant Adam, peccauit homo; quia si peccauit ipse homo, pec- 
cauit humana natura, quae est homo. Sed humana natura tota tunc erat in 
ipso, nec usquam erat alibi specialis homo. Cum ergo peccauit persona, sci­
licet ipse homo, peccauit tota natura, scilicet communis homo." Odo makes
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the same point at greater length earlier (pecc. or. 2 1081D-1082A): “Ecce pec- 
cauit utraque persona suggestione serpentis, peccauit, inquam, utraque nec- 
dum substantiam suam habentibus alibi quam in se, quae nondum erat alibi 
quam ibi. Si uero persona peccauit, sine sua substantia non peccauit. Est ergo 
personae substantia peccato uitiata, et inficit peccatum substantiam, quae 
nusquam est extra peccatricem personam. Substantia uero una et eadem est 
utriusque personae communis ipsis et specialis. In peccatricibus ergo personis 
est infecta peccato natura specialis, quae non est alibi quam in ipsis. In anima 
Adam ergo peccato tota natura humanae animae; quae communis substan­
tia est, est specialis utriusque. Extra has enim nondum est eam esse. Si enim 
fuisset in aliis diuisa, pro ipsis solis non inficeretur tota. Quia si peccassent 
istae, forsitan non peccassent aliae, in quibus esset salua humanae animae 
natura. Nunc autem ubi poterat anima humana munda esse quae peccatrix 
erat ubique?"
35. John of Salisbury, metalog. 2.17.27: “There is another philosopher who, 
along with Joscelin the Bishop of Soissons, attributes universality to things 
collected into one and denies it of singulars."
36. “Speciem igitur dico esse non illam essentiam hominis solum quae est 
in Socrate uel quae est in aliquo alio indiuiduorum sed totam illam collectio- 
nem ex singulis illis materiis factam, id est unum quasi gregem de essentia 
hominis Socrates sustinet, et singulis aliis huius naturae coniunctum. Quae 
tota collectio, quamuis essentialiter multa sit, ab auctoritatibus tamen 'una 
species' 'unum uniuersale' 'una natura' appellatur, sicut populus (quamuis ex 
multis personis collectus sit) unus dicitur."
37. Attende! Verum est quidem quod illa humanitas quae ante mille annos 
fuit uel quae heri, non est illa quae hodie est. Sed tamen est eadem cum illa, id 
est creationis non dissimilis. Non enim quicquid idem est cum alio idem est 
illud. . . . Socrates quoque ex pluribus atomis constat uir quam puer, et tamen 
idem est."
38. “Quod si quis opponat: 'Ergo constitutum ex quinque essentiis species 
est, ipsum enim pluribus inhaeret materialiter', responde modo: Nil ad rem 
quia non est natura, hic autem tantum agitur de naturis. Si autem quaeras: 
Quid appellent naturam? Audi: Naturam dico quicquid dissimilis creationis 
est ab omnibus quae non sunt uel illud uel de illo, siue una essentia sit siue 
plures, ut Socrates dissimilis creationis ab omnibus quae non sunt Socrates. 
Similiter et homo species est dissimilis creationis ab omnibus rebus quae non 
sunt illa species uel aliqua essentia illius speciei, quod non conuenit cuilibet 
collecto ex aliquot essentiis humanitatis. Nam illud non est dissimilis creatio- 
nis a reliquis essentiis quae in illa specie sunt."
39. “Inhaerere autem dico humanitatem Socrati, non quod tota consuma- 
tur in Socrate sed una tantum eius pars Socratitate informatur. Sic enim dicor 
tangere parietem, non quod singulae partes mei parieti haereant sed forsitan 
sola summitas digiti qua haerente dicor tangere."
40. “Et ideo alia uia procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui 
nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conueni- 
unt in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in ciuilibus 
omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota 
communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod participatione 
speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam de- 
riuati, sunt tanquam multa membra unius corporis. Actus autem unius mem- 
bri corporalis, puta manus, non est uoluntarius uoluntate ipsius manus, sed 
uoluntate animae, quae primo mouet membra. Unde homicidium quod ma­
nus committit, non manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum 
se ut diuisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei est aliquid hominis quod mouetur a 
primo principio motiuo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio quae est in homine, ex
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Adam generato, non est uoluntaria uoluntate ipsius sed uoluntate primi pa­
rentis, qui mouet motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine deriuantur, 
sicut uoluntas animae mouet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod 
sic a primo parente in posteros deriuatur, dicitur originale, sicut peccatum 
quod ab anima deriuatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Et sicut pecca­
tum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius 
membri nisi inquantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter 
quod uocatur peccatum humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum 
huius personae, nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo par­
ente; unde et uocatur peccatum naturae."
41. “Aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis ex culpa alicuius pro- 
genitorum causatam."
42. So sum. theol. 1a.91.1. Aquinas does not draw Augustine's distinction 
between immortality, mortality, and being destined to die. See also sum. theol. 
1a.97.1 and 1a2ae.85.5.
